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Introducing Identity
David Buckingham
Institute of Education, University of London, Centre for the Study of Children, Youth and Media
Identity is an ambiguous and slippery term. It has been used—and perhaps overused—in
many different contexts and for many different purposes, particularly in recent years. As we
shall see, there are some diverse assumptions about what identity is, and about its relevance
to our understanding of young people’s engagements with digital media.
The fundamental paradox of identity is inherent in the term itself. From the Latin root
idem, meaning “the same,” the term nevertheless implies both similarity and difference.
On the one hand, identity is something unique to each of us that we assume is more or
less consistent (and hence the same) over time. For instance, as I write, there is an intense
debate in the U.K. about the government’s proposed introduction of identity cards and their
potential for addressing the problem of “identity theft.” In these formulations, our identity
is something we uniquely possess: it is what distinguishes us from other people. Yet on the
other hand, identity also implies a relationship with a broader collective or social group of
some kind. When we talk about national identity, cultural identity, or gender identity, for
example, we imply that our identity is partly a matter of what we share with other people.
Here, identity is about identiﬁcation with others whom we assume are similar to us (if not
exactly the same), at least in some signiﬁcant ways.
Much of the debate around identity derives from the tensions between these two aspects. I
may struggle to “bemyself” or to “ﬁndmy true self,” and there aremanywould-be experts and
authorities who claim to be able to help me to do this. Yet I also seek multiple identiﬁcations
with others, on the basis of social, cultural, and biological characteristics, as well as shared
values, personal histories, and interests. On one level, I am the product of my unique personal
biography. Yet who I am (or who I think I am) varies according to who I am with, the social
situations in which I ﬁnd myself, and the motivations I may have at the time, although I am
by no means entirely free to choose how I am deﬁned.
An explicit concern with questions of identity is not a novel development, although it has
undoubtedly taken on a new urgency in the contemporary world.1 Identity is not merely
a matter of playful experimentation or “personal growth”: it is also about the life-or-death
struggles for self-determination that are currently being waged in so many parts of the world.
According to the social theorist Zygmunt Bauman, the new prominence that is accorded to
identity is a reﬂection of the fact that it is becoming ever more problematic.2 Globalization,
the decline of the welfare state, increasing social mobility, greater ﬂexibility in employment,
insecurity in personal relationships—all these developments are contributing to a sense of
fragmentation and uncertainty, in which the traditional resources for identity formation
are no longer so straightforward or so easily available. Like many contemporary authors,
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Bauman emphasizes the ﬂuidity of identity, seeing it as almost inﬁnitely negotiable, and
in the process perhaps underestimates the continuing importance of routine and stability.
Nevertheless, his general point is well taken: “identity” only becomes an issue when it is
threatened or contested in some way and needs to be explicitly asserted.
Accounting for Identities
Within the human sciences, several disciplinary specialisms have laid claim to identity.
The most obvious distinction here is between psychological and sociological approaches,
but a whole range of subdisciplines and intellectual paradigms—developmental psychology,
social theory, symbolic interactionism, cultural studies, and many others—have also sought
to generate deﬁnitive accounts. In the ﬁrst part of this chapter, I discuss ﬁve key approaches
to thinking about identity and brieﬂy identify some of their implications for understanding
young people, digital media, and learning. These latter issues are then dealt with more
explicitly in the second main part of the chapter.
Identity Formation: The Psychology of Adolescence
The ﬁrst two approaches I discuss here are explicitly concerned with youth identities. The
modern psychological account of youth can arguably be traced back to G. Stanley Hall’s
classic accounts of adolescence, published in the early years of the last century.3 Hall is
often credited with introducing the popular notion of adolescence as a period of “storm
and stress,” characterized by intergenerational conﬂicts, mood swings and an enthusiasm
for risky behavior. From this perspective, the discussion of adolescence often leads inex-
orably to the discussion of drugs, delinquency, depression, and sexual deviance. Hall’s ap-
proach is perhaps best termed “psycho-biological”: his symptomatically titled book Youth:
Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene (1906) includes extensive proposals for education and
moral and religious training, incorporating practical advice on gymnastics and muscular
development (not to mention quaint discussions of “sex dangers” and the virtues of cold
baths).
Another classic psychological account of adolescence can be found in the work of Erik
Erikson, most notably in his book Identity: Youth and Crisis, published in 1968.4 Erikson’s
developmental theory extends Piaget’s account of “ages and stages” into adulthood and old
age. Each of his eight stages is characterized by a fundamental psychological conﬂict, whose
successful resolution allows progression to the next stage. In the case of adolescence, the
conﬂict is between identity and “role confusion.” Resolving this conﬂict involves ﬁnding
a more or less settled role in life, and it results in the formation of a “virtue” (a form of
psychological strength)—in this case, loyalty or ﬁdelity—that enables the young person to
progress to early adulthood and to form the intimate attachments that are the key tasks of
that stage. Unsuccessful resolution results in a “maladaptation,” for instance in the form of
fanaticism or a repudiation of adult responsibility.
Erikson therefore sees adolescence as a critical period of identity formation, in which
individuals overcome uncertainty, become more self-aware of their strengths and weak-
nesses, and become more conﬁdent in their own unique qualities. In order to move on,
adolescents must undergo a “crisis” in which they address key questions about their values
and ideals, their future occupation or career, and their sexual identity. Through this pro-
cess of self-reﬂection and self-deﬁnition, adolescents arrive at an integrated, coherent sense
of their identity as something that persists over time. While this is partly a psychological
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process—and indeed a function of general cognitive development—it also occurs through
interaction with peers and care givers. Identity is developed by the individual, but it has to
be recognized and conﬁrmed by others. Adolescence is thus also a period in which young
people negotiate their separation from their family, and develop independent social com-
petence (for example, through participation in “cliques” and larger “crowds” of peers, who
exert different types of inﬂuence).
James Marcia builds on Erikson’s account, focusing particularly on the notion of adoles-
cence as a period of “identity crisis.”5 Through this period, the young person has to consider
potential life choices and eventually make a commitment or psychological investment in
particular decisions. Marcia identiﬁes four “identity statuses,” which represent different po-
sitions in this process. In the case of “foreclosure,” the individual has effectively avoided
the crisis by following others’ expectations; in “diffusion,” the person has given up on the
attempt to make the necessary commitment; in “moratorium,” the individual is still actively
in the period of crisis, testing out various alternative commitments, while “achievement”
only arrives when the person has been through the crisis and made clear choices about who
he or she wants to become.
Of course, it is possible to debate the validity of such stage-based theories: is adolescence
in fact a distinctive stage with a beginning and an end, or is human development more
appropriately seen as a matter of gradual progression? Erikson and his followers claim that the
stages they identify are universal, although it could be argued that “adolescence” as such does
not exist in earlier historical periods, or in other cultures.6 Others, like the psychologist Carol
Gilligan, have argued that moral development takes a different path for males and females,
which again implies that such generalized models may not take a sufﬁcient account of social
differences.7 Furthermore, like most developmental theories, this approach is ultimately
very normative. The healthy, mature individual is one who has attained a stable, integrated
identity. Continuing “confusion” about one’s identity is a mark of incomplete development,
and may result in deviant or antisocial behavior. From this perspective, adolescence is seen
primarily as a state of transition, a matter of “becoming” rather than “being.”8 Adolescents’
key dilemmas are to do with what they will become, particularly in terms of their future
occupation and their relationships: their current experiences are only signiﬁcant insofar as
they help them resolve their crisis and hence move on.
Despite the criticisms that can be made here, psychological accounts of adolescence do
provide some useful concepts with which to interpret young people’s relations with dig-
ital media. Erikson’s notion of adolescence as a “psychosocial moratorium,” a period of
“time out” in which young people can experiment with different potential identities—and
indeed engage with risks of various kinds—seems particularly appropriate in this respect.
These kinds of approaches are exempliﬁed (and indeed contested) by several of the contrib-
utors to this volume. For example, Susannah Stern’s discussion of young people’s online
authorship of blogs and home pages suggests that this activity can provide important op-
portunities for self-reﬂection and self-realization, and for expressing some of the conﬂicts
and crises that characterize this period. Some of the young people whom she discusses ex-
plicitly see adolescence as an “in-between stage,” in which they are consciously seeking
future directions in their lives. In a different vein, danah boyd’s chapter also implies that
social networking sites like MySpace provide opportunities for social interaction and afﬁl-
iation that are crucial developmental tasks for this age group—opportunities that are all
the more important now, as their access to “ofﬂine” public spaces has become increasingly
restricted.
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Youth Culture and the Sociology of Youth
Sociologists generally take a very different perspective on youth compared with the psy-
chological accounts I have just outlined. Of course, there are some similarities between
psychological studies of development and sociological analyses of socialization, despite the
differences in terminology: both are essentially concerned with the ways in which young
people are gradually prepared, or prepare themselves, to take up their allotted roles in adult
life. A traditional, functionalist account of socialization would see this in equally normative
terms: the young person is a passive recipient of adult inﬂuences, a “becoming” rather than
a “being” in their own right.
Mainstream sociologists have also been particularly concerned with issues of youthful
deviance and delinquency, in ways that often entail a pathological view of young people.
Youth—particularly youth in marginalized or subordinated social groups—are frequently
constructed as a “social problem” or “at risk.” This then serves to legitimate various forms
of treatment—the work of social, educational, and clinical agencies that seeks to discipline
or rehabilitate troublesome youth, or to deﬁne and correct their apparent deﬁciencies. Nev-
ertheless, sociologists generally understand these phenomena in terms of social factors such
as poverty and inequality rather than as a matter of “raging hormones”: their interest is not
so much in internal personality conﬂicts, but more in the social uncertainties that young
people face, for example as they make the transition from the parental home to the labor
market.9
Furthermore, sociologists acknowledge that the nature of youth varies signiﬁcantly accord-
ing to the social context, and particularly in relation to factors such as social class, gender,
and ethnicity. Indeed, social historians have argued that “youth” is a relatively modern in-
vention, which has resulted from the extension of the period of transition that lasts from
the end of compulsory schooling to the entry into waged labor; and this is clearly something
that varies signiﬁcantly between different social groups and between different cultural set-
tings (in parts of the world where children leave school at the age of eleven, for example,
“youth” is unlikely to be seen as a distinct category).10 More recently, one could argue that
youth is increasingly deﬁned through the operations of the commercial market. The cate-
gory of the “teenager,” for example, was effectively brought into being in the 1950s through
market research; and in contemporary marketing discourse, we can see the emergence of
a whole series of newly invented categories such as “tweens,” “middle youth,” “kidults,”
and “adultescents”—categories that crucially blur the distinctions between children, youth
and adults.11 The invention and use of a category like “Generation X” (and its subsequent
mutations) reﬂects both the importance and the complexity of age-based distinctions in con-
temporary consumer culture.12 As this implies, “youth” is essentially a social and historical
construct, rather than a universal state of being.
More radical youth research within Cultural Studies has contested the view of youthful
expression as simply a function of adult attempts at socialization. There is a long tradition
here of empirical research on youth culture, dating back to the early 1970s, and it is mostly
concerned with the ways in which young people appropriate cultural commodities and use
them for their own devices. Much of this work has focused on speciﬁc youth “subcultures”—
groups such as hippies, skinheads, punks, goths, ravers, and others—who are seen to be
resisting or opposing the imperatives of the parent culture, for example, through fashion,
dance, music, and other cultural forms. Subcultures are seen here not just as a subordinate,
but also as subversive: they arise from contradictions and tensions in the dominant social
order and represent a threat to established social norms.13
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Initially, much of this research focused on male, working class “street culture,” although
there is now a growing body of research on the youth cultures of girls and young women,
and (to a lesser extent) on speciﬁc ethnic subcultures.14 The emphasis here—as in some work
on the anthropology of childhood and youth15—has been on attempting to understand
youth cultures in their own terms, “from the bottom up,” rather than judging them in
terms of adult-oriented notions such as socialization. However, more recent research has
pointed to the dangers of romanticizing youthful resistance and the tendency to overstate the
political dimensions of youth culture. It has also challenged the rather simplistic opposition
between “subversive” and “mainstream” culture, arguing that youth cultures can be just as
hierarchical and exclusive as any other social groupings.16 Some recent research has suggested
that contemporary youth cultures are increasingly diverse and fragmented, and that they are
best seen, not as a matter of self-contained “subcultures” but in a more ﬂuid way, as “scenes”
or “lifestyles” to which young people may be only temporarily attached.17 Even so, there
has been relatively little research on the more mundane, even conformist, cultures of young
people who are not members of such “spectacular” or oppositional groupings (or indeed on
afﬂuent middle-class youth).
Despite its limitations, this kind of research focuses attention on the social and cultural
dimensions of young people’s identities, in ways which are particularly relevant to their
interactions with digital media. On the one hand, we clearly need to acknowledge how
commercial forces both create opportunities and set limits on young people’s digital cultures;
and we should also not forget that access to these media—and the ways in which they are
used—is partly dependent upon differences to do with factors such as social class, gender,
and ethnicity. Yet, on the other hand, we also need to consider how these media provide
young people with symbolic resources for constructing or expressing their own identities,
and, in some instances, for evading or directly resisting adult authority.
These points are taken up in different ways in several of the contributions that follow.
Sandra Weber and Claudia Mitchell, for example, provide a series of case studies taken from
very different cultural contexts that illustrate some of the diverse ways in which young people
use digital media to reﬂect particular subcultural allegiances, or indeed to claim “spaces” that
escape adult control. Likewise, Shelley Goldman, Meghan McDermott, and Angela Booker
provide an example of how young people can use media production to address social issues
that are of particular concern for them, and to make their voices heard by a wider audience.
On the other hand, Susan Herring’s chapter offers an important challenge to the assumptions
that are often made about young people and their relations with technology—assumptions
that frequently seem to veer between moral panics about the dangers of new media and an
exaggerated romanticism about their liberating potential.
Social Identity: The Individual and the Group
Both the approaches outlined so far are directly concerned with youth identities, and the con-
trast between them amply illustrates some of the broader differences between psychological
and sociological perspectives. Yet the discussion of identity obviously extends much more
widely than this. The remaining three perspectives I discuss here are concerned with broader
questions about the changing nature of identities, and the means of identify formation, in
modern societies.
There is a large and diverse body of work within sociology, social psychology, and anthro-
pology concerned with the relations between individual and group identities.18 Researchers
have studied how people categorize or label themselves and others, how they identify as
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members of particular groups; how a sense of group belonging or “community” is devel-
oped and maintained, and how groups discriminate against outsiders; how the boundaries
between groups operate, and how groups relate to each other; and how institutions deﬁne
and organize identities. These processes operate at both social and individual levels: individ-
uals may make claims about their identity (for example, by asserting afﬁliation with other
members of a group), but those claims need to be recognized by others. In seeking to deﬁne
their identity, people attempt to assert their individuality, but also to join with others, and
they work to sustain their sense of status or self-esteem in doing so. As a result, the formation
of identity often involves a process of stereotyping or “cognitive simpliﬁcation” that allows
people to distinguish easily between self and other, and to deﬁne themselves and their group
in positive ways.
Drawing on this approach, Richard Jenkins argues that social identity should be seen not
so much as a ﬁxed possession, but as a social process, in which the individual and the social
are inextricably related.19 Individual selfhood is a social phenomenon, but the social world
is constituted through the actions of individuals. As such, identity is a ﬂuid, contingent
matter—it is something we accomplish practically through our ongoing interactions and
negotiations with other people. In this respect, it might be more appropriate to talk about
identiﬁcation rather than identity.
One classic example of this approach is Erving Goffman’s The Presentation of Self in Everyday
Life, ﬁrst published in the late 1950s.20 Goffman provides what he calls a “dramaturgical”
account of social interaction as a kind of theatrical performance. Individuals seek to create im-
pressions on others that will enable them to achieve their goals (“impression management”),
and they may join or collude with others to create collaborative performances in doing so.
Goffman distinguishes here between “front-stage” and “back-stage” behavior. When “on
stage,” for example in a workplace or in a social gathering, individuals tend to conform to
standardized deﬁnitions of the situation and of their individual role within it, playing out
a kind of ritual. Back stage, they have the opportunity to be more honest: the impressions
created while on stage may be directly contradicted, and the team of performers may disagree
with each other.
Critics have argued that Goffman tends to overstate the importance of rules and to ne-
glect the aspects of improvisation, or indeed sheer habit, that characterize everyday social
interaction. More signiﬁcantly, he suggests that back-stage behavior is somehow more au-
thentic, or closer to the truth of the individual’s real identity, which appears to imply that
front-stage behavior is somehow less sincere or less honest. This could be seen to neglect the
extent to which all social interaction is a kind of performance. Like some other researchers in
this tradition, Goffman sometimes appears to make a problematic distinction between per-
sonal identity and social identity, as though collective identiﬁcations or performances were
somehow separate from individual ones, which are necessarily more “truthful.”21
Nevertheless, this approach has several implications for our understanding of young peo-
ple’s uses of digital media. It is most obviously appropriate for understanding online inter-
actions, for example, in the case of instant messaging, chat or social networking, and for
mobile communication, where questions of rules and etiquette are clearly crucial—not least
because of the absence of many of the other cues (such as visual ones) we conventionally
use to make identity claims in everyday life. The issue of performance is also very relevant
to the ways in which young people construct identities, for example, via the use of avatars,
e-mail signatures, IM nicknames, and (in a more elaborate way) in personal homepages
and blogs. The question of whether online identities are more or less honest or truthful
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than ofﬂine ones has of course been a recurrent concern in studies of computer-mediated
communication.22
These kinds of issues are explored in various ways in the subsequent chapters. For example,
Gitte Stald’s discussion of young people’s uses of mobile phones points to several ways in
which mobile technologies may be changing—or at least intensifying—the forms of social
connectedness that characterize their interactions both with friends and family. The use of
mobiles requires young people to develop new social and communicative skills and new
social norms that enable them to regulate these relationships. Similarly, danah boyd’s anal-
ysis of how friendships are conducted in MySpace draws attention to the complex ways in
which hierarchies are formed, impressions are managed and social roles are played out; and
while these processes have much in common with those that apply in traditional “ofﬂine”
relationships, they have nevertheless generated signiﬁcant anxiety for many adults.
Reclaiming Identities: Identity Politics
Questions of social power are implicit in social identity theory, but they come to the fore
in what is often termed “identity politics.” Clearly, different groups of individuals will lay
claim to positive identities in quite different ways, and these claims may be recognized as
more or less legitimate by those who hold power in society. As such, questions of identity are
inevitably tied up with the issue of social status. The term “identity politics” refers primarily
to activist social movements that have explicitly sought to challenge this process: they have
struggled to resist oppressive accounts of their identities constructed by others who hold
power over them, and claimed the right to self-determination. The most obvious aspects of
this relate to “race,” ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and disability; although the term “identity
politics” is also often used in relation to forms of indigenous nationalism, religious groupings
(and indeed forms of “fundamentalism”), and so on.
Identity politics thus entails a call for the recognition of aspects of identity that have
previously been denied, marginalized, or stigmatized. Yet this call is not in the name of
some generalized “humanity”: it is a claim for identity not in spite of difference, but because
of it. As this implies, identity politics is very much about transformation at the level of
the group, rather than merely the individual: it is about identiﬁcation and solidarity. Issues
of representation—about who has the right to represent, or to speak, and for whom—are
therefore also crucial here.23
Identity politics has been popularly criticized, both from the political right (as a kind of
special pleading) and from the political left (as a diversion from the imperatives of the class
struggle). But even in its own terms, identity politics has raised some signiﬁcant problems
that do not seem capable of easy resolutions. Perhaps the most fundamental issue here is that
of essentialism, that is, the tendency to generalize about the members of a particular group
and assimilate them to a singular identity. This approach runs the risk of ﬁxing identity, for
example in terms of people’s biological characteristics or their historical origins, and ignoring
their diversity. It neglects the fact that people have multiple dimensions to their identities,
and may well resist having to select one that will override all the others.
Exponents of identity politics have argued that a kind of strategic essentialism may be
necessary for particular purposes, and that different coalitions may be formed at different
times. But such alliances can founder on the almost inﬁnite factions and subdivisions that can
emerge: does “race” override gender, for example, and who has the right to say that it does?
Furthermore, different forms of power can operate within groups as well as between them:
for example, women may unite to resist male oppression, but middle-class women will have
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access to other ways of exercising social power that are not available to their working-class
counterparts. There is often a tension within such social movements between two contrasting
aims—on the one hand, a claim for separatism (which can result in marginalization), and on
the other, a move towards integration with the mainstream (which can result in the erasure
of identity).
In some respects, therefore, the difﬁculties of identity politics follow from the fundamental
paradox of identity with which we began. It could be argued that this kind of identity
categorization is inevitably reductive; and yet all sorts of well-established social practices—
and indeed laws—are based on such categories, for example, in the case of racial proﬁling,
citizenship laws, immigration priorities, as well as the various “isms” of racism, sexism,
homophobia, and so on. Of course, emphasizing aspects of identity that are shared inevitably
means playing down aspects that differ. Yet claiming authenticity for a given identity is
problematic when that identity is deﬁned in opposition to another. To assert what is uniquely
female (or feminine), for example, is to run the risk of reinforcing the binary opposition
(male/female) that one is seeking to challenge. To assert “racial” authenticity with reference
to unique historical origins or roots is to reassert the differences (and indeed the socially
constructed category of “race”) that one is seeking to undermine.24 Yet to do the opposite—
to celebrate gender ﬂuidity or ethnic “hybridity”—is to run the risk of dissolving the very
identities on which political claims can be made.
Queer theory offers a radical challenge to identity politics on precisely these grounds. It
challenges established identity categories—including “gay” and “lesbian”—on the grounds
that they inevitably lead to essentialism, to normative conceptions of identity, and to
exclusion.25 Judith Butler, for example, argues that attempts to articulate the interests of
“women” as a speciﬁc, uniﬁed group merely reinforce binary views of gender and close
down possibilities for other, more ﬂuid or subversive, formations of gender and sexuality.26
Interestingly, there are several similarities between Butler’s notion of identity and Goffman’s
apparently more traditional one: she too argues that identity is performed, although (unlike
Goffman) she does not seem to imply that there is a “back-stage,” personal identity that
is more authentic than the “masquerade” of everyday social life. Likewise—although queer
theorists might well resist such comparisons—they have much in common with the social
identity theories outlined above, not least in the idea of identity as a ﬂuid, ongoing process,
something that is permanently “under construction.” From both perspectives, identity is
something we do, rather than simply something we are.
Of course, there are some signiﬁcant criticisms that can be made of such an approach. It
can be seen to imply that identity is just a matter of free choice—that individuals can simply
assume a particular identity at will. Furthermore, it emphasizes the potential for diversity
and resistance to dominant identities, while neglecting the pressure to conform, and the
comparative predictability of everyday behavior. Ultimately, it can be seen to result in a
kind of relativism that undermines any attempt to speak of, or on behalf of, a particular
identity—although that, of course, is precisely the point.
These debates around identity politics suggest some quite different ways of understanding
young people’s relationships with digital media. For example, on the one hand, it could be
argued that the Internet provides signiﬁcant opportunities for exploring facets of identity
that might previously have been denied or stigmatized, or indeed simply for the sharing
of information on such matters. Such arguments presume that media can be used as a
means of expressing or even discovering aspects of one’s “true self,” for example, in relation
to sexuality.27 Yet on the other hand, these media can also be seen to provide powerful
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opportunities for identity play, for parody and subversion of the kind promoted by queer
theory. Here, the emphasis would lie not on honesty and truth, but on the potential for
performance and even for deception. Sherry Turkle’s discussion of the ﬂuidity of online
identities—for example, in the form of “gender bending” in Internet communities—provides
one well-known (and much debated) instance of this kind of approach.28
Several authors in this volume address the complexities of identity politics, particularly in
relation to gender (“race” is the focus of a separate volume in this series). Rebekah Willett,
for example, looks at how girls’ online play with dressing up dolls raises questions about
body image and sexual politics; and while the girls in her study are very self-consciously
critical about these issues, they also differentiate themselves from invisible “others” whom
they believe to be more at risk of negative media inﬂuences. Sandra Weber and Claudia
Mitchell also address questions of gender and ethnicity, looking at how the markers of
positive identities can be quite subtly coded in young people’s online expressions; and they
also explore some uses of digital technologies by socially excluded groups, who tend to be
largely ignored by research in this ﬁeld.
The Modern Subject: Identity in Social Theory
Finally, we need to address some of theways inwhich identity has been deﬁned and addressed
within more general social theories. Two speciﬁc—and quite contrasting—perspectives will
illustrate some of the tensions at stake here.
Anthony Giddens is probably the best-known exponent of a broader argument about the
changing nature of identity in what he terms “late modern” societies.29 Giddens argues that
many of the beliefs and customary practices that used to deﬁne identities in traditional
societies (such as those of organized religion) are now less and less inﬂuential. In this “post-
traditional” society, people have to make a whole range of choices, not just about aspects
such as appearance and lifestyle, but more broadly about their life destinations and relation-
ships. They are offered a plethora of guidance on such matters by experts of various kinds
and by the popular media (for example, in the form of lifestyle news, makeover shows, and
self-help books), although ultimately the individuals are required to make these choices on
their own behalf.
As a result, Giddens suggests, modern individuals have to be constantly “self-reﬂexive,”
making decisions aboutwhat they should do andwho they should be. The self becomes a kind
of “project” that individuals have to work on: they have to create biographical “narratives”
that will explain themselves to themselves, and hence sustain a coherent and consistent
identity. Like many of the other authors I have discussed, Giddens sees identity as ﬂuid
and malleable, rather than ﬁxed. He recognizes that this new freedom places new burdens
and responsibilities on people; particularly in a world of increasing risk and insecurity,
the individual is placed under greater emotional stress. Yet in general, he regards this as a
positive development and as part of a broader process of democratization; modern consumer
culture has offered individuals multiple possibilities to construct and fashion their own
identities, and they are now able to do this in increasingly creative and diverse ways.
There are several problems with Giddens’s argument, but the most signiﬁcant one has to
do with his evidence. It is by no means clear that the processes he is describing are distinctive
to the “late-modern” era, and, more signiﬁcantly, that they actually apply to the majority
of the population (rather than merely to academic social theorists). Some of the difﬁculties
here become apparent when we contrast Giddens’s approach with that of Michel Foucault
and some of his followers. What Giddens appears to regard as a form of liberation (or at least
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self-actualization) is seen by Foucault as simply another means of exercising disciplinary
power. Foucault argues that who we are—or who we perceive ourselves to be—is far from a
matter of individual choice; on the contrary, it is the product of powerful and subtle forms
of “governmentality” that are characteristic of modern liberal democracies.30
Foucault asserts that there has been a shift in the ways in which power is exercised in
the modern world, which is apparent in a whole range of social domains. Rather than
being held (and indeed displayed) by sovereign authorities, power is now diffused through
social relationships; rather than being regulated by external agencies (the government or the
church), individuals are now encouraged to regulate themselves and to ensure that their own
behavior falls within acceptable norms. What Giddens describes as self-reﬂexivity is seen by
Foucault in much more sinister terms, as a process of self-monitoring and self-surveillance.
Giddens’ “project of the self” is recast here as a matter of individuals policing themselves,
and the forms of self-help and therapy that Giddens seems to regard in quite positive terms
are redeﬁned as modern forms of confession, in which individuals are constantly required
to account for themselves and “speak the truth” about their identities.
Nikolas Rose extends Foucault’s argument to the operations of what he calls the “psy
complex”—the forms of academic, therapeutic and institutional expertise that make up
modern psychology.31 This “technology of the self,” he argues, actively forms what it means
to be human, and in the process, it seeks to regulate and control individual behavior in
line with limited social norms. While appearing to act in the name of individual freedom,
autonomy, and choice, such technologies ultimately give the power to experts to determine
the ways in which identity can be deﬁned.
As with Giddens’s theories, there are questions that might be raised here about how this
very generalized analysis actually plays out in individuals’ everyday lives. Yet although there
are some striking differences between these approaches, they do draw attention to some
signiﬁcant shifts in how identity is constructed and experienced in the contemporary world.
In my view, this is important to bear in mind when we consider the speciﬁc nature of young
people’s interactions with digital media. As I shall argue below, one of the major problems
with popular debates in this ﬁeld is the tendency to regard technology as the driving force of
social change. Social theory of the kind I have discussed here reminds us that technological
change is often merely part of much broader social and historical developments. In particular,
I would suggest that the individualization made possible by digital technology could be seen
as an instance of much more general shifts in the ways in which identity is deﬁned and lived
out in modern societies, although (as this section has made clear) it is possible to interpret
these developments in very different ways.
Here again, these questions are taken up by several of the contributors to this book. Gitte
Stald’s account of the role of mobile phones in generating a sense of (and indeed a require-
ment for) constant “presence,” Susannah Stern’s discussion of how teenagers construct and
fashion particular forms of identity online, and danah boyd’s analysis of how young people
“write themselves into being” on social networking sites indicate just some of the ways in
which these broader social theories might be used in analyzing speciﬁc aspects of young
people’s digital cultures. Rebekah Willett’s chapter confronts some of these arguments more
directly, drawing on Giddens and Rose to challenge the emphasis on “compulsory individ-
uality” that she sees as a characteristic of contemporary “neo liberal” discourses. She argues
that young people are being encouraged to construct identities in terms that are aligned
with consumer culture: far from being free to “express themselves,” the forms of that expres-
sion are in fact being regulated in ever more subtle ways. Finally, Kirsten Drotner’s chapter
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suggests that the new forms of identity work that are required in complex, “late-modern”
societies call on new forms of cultural competence that schools need to address much more
directly than they currently do.
Digital Media, Young People, and Learning
Among the different views of identity outlined in the ﬁrst part of this chapter, there is often
a shared assumption that the ways in which identity is deﬁned (and hence what counts as
identity) are undergoing far-reaching changes in the contemporary world. This is certainly
debatable, but it does imply that one place to look for evidence of change would be young
people, and perhaps speciﬁcally young people’s relationwith new technologies. In the second
part of this chapter, therefore, I intend to raise some broad points about how we understand
digital technology, youth, and ﬁnally learning.
Technology: The Limits of Determinism
Technology is frequently held to be transforming social relationships, the economy, and vast
areas of public and private life. Such arguments are routinely recycled in popular debates,
in advertising and publicity materials, and indeed in academic contexts as well. As Carolyn
Marvin (1988) has indicated, such discourses have a long history. She shows how the in-
troduction of electricity and telecommunications in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries was both encouraged and challenged by discourses that attributed enormous power
to technology. On the one hand, these technologies were promoted through forms of expert
“boosterism,” which gloriﬁed the opportunities they presented, yet on the other, there were
frequent claims that technology might be threatening established social relationships. The
telephone, for example, was celebrated for the way in which it could make business more
efﬁcient and facilitate more democratic forms of social life, yet it was also condemned for its
disruption of intimate relationships and its unsettling of established social hierarchies.
Needless to say, there are striking similarities between these debates almost a century
ago and those that currently surround the use of digital technology. Popular discussions
of the Internet, for example, veer between celebration and paranoia; on the one hand, the
technology is seen to create new forms of community and civic life and to offer immense
resources for personal liberation and empowerment, while on the other, it is believed to pose
dangers to privacy, to create new forms of inequality and commercial exploitation, as well as
leaving the individual prey to addiction and pornography. On the one hand, the technology
is seen to liberate the individual from constraint and from narrowly hierarchical ways of
working, while on the other, it is regarded as a false substitute for the supposedly authentic
values it is seen to be replacing.
Such discourses typically embody a form of technological determinism.32 From this perspec-
tive, technology is seen to emerge from a neutral process of scientiﬁc research and devel-
opment, rather than from the interplay of complex social, economic, and political forces.
Technology is then seen to have effects—to bring about social and psychological changes—
irrespective of the ways in which it is used, and of the social contexts and processes into
which it enters. Like the printing press, television, and other new technologies that preceded
it, the computer is seen as an autonomous force that is somehow independent of human
society and acts upon it from outside. In the case of education, this often takes the form
of what might be called “information determinism.” Information is seen as a neutral good,
which appears as if from nowhere. Learning often seems to be equated simply with access
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to information, and in providing this access, technology is seen to perform an essentially
beneﬁcial function.33
This “transcendent” view of technology and of information has been widely challenged.
Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, for example, argue that it leads to a “desocialized” view of
technology, which ignores its social history and sees it as somehow “inﬂuencing society yet
beyond the inﬂuence of society.”34 Likewise, notions of the “information society” and the
“knowledge economy,” which are often used to justify the growing use of information tech-
nology in schools, involve some highly debatable assumptions about the changing nature
of employment and about the skills that workers will need in order to function effectively in
the new economic and technological order. More broadly, the claim that the “information
society” represents a new mode of social organization, in which established forms of eco-
nomic, political, and social activity are being fundamentally altered—and the assumption
that this change is somehow an inevitable consequence of technology—has been widely
challenged.35
However, such critics also point to the dangers of an opposite view—the notion that
technology is somehow entirely shaped by existing social relations. Crudely, this approach
sees technology as simply a matter of what people choose to make of it: it has no inherent
qualities and is regarded as essentially value free. This ignores the fact that technologies have
inherent potentialities or “affordances”: it is much easier to use them for some purposes than
for others. Relatively few of these affordances are inevitable: the history of technology is full
of examples of unanticipated consequences and even subversive uses. Even so, the forms
that technology takes are largely shaped by the social actors and social institutions that play
a leading role in producing it, and in determining where, when, and how it will be used, and
by whom.
In his inﬂuential discussion of television, Raymond Williams makes a powerful argument
for a more dialectical approach, in which technology is both socially shaped and socially
shaping.36 In other words, its role and impact is partly determined by the uses to which
it is put, but it also contains inherent constraints and possibilities which limit the ways in
which it can be used, and which are in turn largely shaped by the social interests of those
who control its production, circulation, and distribution. This approach thus begins to move
beyond the notion of technology as a simple “cause” of social change (on the one hand) and
the idea of technology as an easy “ﬁx” for complex social problems (on the other).
Similar arguments can be made about media or modes of communication. For example,
the so-called “medium theory” of Marshall McLuhan implies that speciﬁc media necessarily
create or promote particular forms of consciousness, and hence particular forms of social
organization.37 Likewise, theories of “multimodal communication” appear to assume that
changes in the dominant modes of communication—for example, from the predominantly
verbal to the more visual style of the contemporary media—necessarily result in changes
in social relationships.38 These kinds of arguments have often been used to support far-
reaching assertions about the liberating impact of new media. Yet here again, such theories
tend to neglect the diverse ways in which these different media or modes of communication
are used, and they ignore the complex and sometimes quite contradictory relationships
between media change and social power.
Rethinking the Digital Generation
These kinds of ideas about the impact of technology tend to take on an even greater force
when they are combined with ideas about childhood and youth. The debate about the
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impact of media and technology on children has always served as a focus for much broader
hopes and fears about social change.39 On the one hand, there is a powerful discourse about
the ways in which digital technology is threatening or even destroying childhood.40 Young
people are seen to be at risk, not only from more obvious dangers such as pornography and
online pedophiles, but also from a wide range of negative physical and psychological conse-
quences that derive from their engagement with technology. Like television, digital media
are seen to be responsible for a whole litany of social ills—addiction, antisocial behavior, obe-
sity, educational underachievement, commercial exploitation, stunted imaginations . . . and
the list goes on.
In recent years, however, the debate has come to be dominated by a very different argu-
ment. Unlike those who bemoan the media’s destruction of childhood innocence, advocates
of the new “digital generation” regard technology as a force of liberation for young people—a
means for them to reach past the constraining inﬂuence of their elders, and to create new,
autonomous forms of communication and community. Far from corrupting the young, tech-
nology is seen to be creating a generation that is more open, more democratic, more creative,
and more innovative than their parents’ generation.
For example, Marc Prensky makes a distinction between digital “natives” (who have grown
up with this technology) and digital “immigrants” (adults who have come to it later in life)
that has been widely inﬂuential in popular debate.41 Prensky argues that digital natives have
a very different style of learning: they crave interactivity, they value graphics before words;
they want random access, and they operate at the “twitch speed” of video games and MTV.
As a result, they are dissatisﬁed with old styles of instruction, based on exposition and step-
by-step logic: they see digital immigrants as speaking in an entirely alien, outdated language.
Prensky even suggests that digital natives have a very different brain structure from that of
immigrants, as though technology had precipitated a form of physical evolution within a
period of little more than a decade.
Likewise, Don Tapscott’s Growing Up Digital: The Rise of the Net Generation is based on two
sets of binary oppositions, between technologies (television versus the Internet) and between
generations (the “baby boomers” versus the “net generation”).42 Tapscott’s oppositions be-
tween these technologies are stark and absolute. Television is a passive medium, while the net
is active; television “dumbs down” its users, while the net raises their intelligence; television
broadcasts a singular view of the world, while the net is democratic and interactive; television
isolates, while the net builds communities; and so on. Just as television is the antithesis of the
net, so the “television generation” is the antithesis of the “net generation.” Like the technol-
ogy they now control, the values of the “television generation” are increasingly conservative,
“hierarchical, inﬂexible and centralized.” By contrast, the “N-Geners” are “hungry for ex-
pression, discovery, and their own self-development”: they are savvy, self-reliant, analytical,
articulate, creative, inquisitive, accepting of diversity, and socially conscious. These genera-
tional differences are seen to be produced by technology, rather than being a result of other
social, historical, or cultural forces. Unlike their parents, who are portrayed as incompetent
“technophobes,” young people are seen to possess an intuitive, spontaneous relationship
with digital technology. “For many kids,” Tapscott argues, “using the new technology is as
natural as breathing.” Technology is the means of their empowerment, and it will ultimately
lead to a “generational explosion.”
From this perspective, technology is seen to have brought about fundamental changes in
a whole range of areas. It has created new styles of communication and interaction, and new
means for constructing community. It has produced new styles of playful learning, which go
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beyond the teacher-dominated, authoritarian approach of old style education. It is creating
new competencies or forms of “literacy,” which require and produce new intellectual powers,
and even “more complex brain structures.” It provides new ways of forming identity, and
hence new forms of personhood; and by offering communication with different aspects of
the self, it enables young people to relate to the world and to others in more powerful ways.
Finally, these technologies are seen to be leading to the emergence of a new kind of politics,
which is more distributed and democratic: the Internet, for example, is “a medium for social
awakening,” which is producing a generation that is more tolerant, more globally oriented,
more inclined to exercise social and civic responsibility, and to respect the environment.
Wishful thinking of this kind undoubtedly has its pleasures, but it is important to address
some of the fundamental limitations of these arguments. The technologically determinist
stance adopted by these authors means that there are many issues and phenomena that they
are bound to ignore. They tend to neglect the fundamental continuities and interdependen-
cies between new media and “old” media (such as television)—continuities that exist at the
level of form and content, as well as in terms of economics. A longer historical view clearly
shows that old and new technologies often come to coexist: particularly in the area of media,
the advent of a new technology may change the functions or uses of old technologies, but it
rarely completely displaces them. On average, members of the “net generation” in fact spend
more of their time watching television than they do on the Internet; and of course there are
many members of the “television generation” who spend much of their working and leisure
time online.
This relentlessly optimistic view inevitably ignores many of the down sides of these
technologies—the undemocratic tendencies of many online “communities,” the limited
nature of much so-called digital learning and the grinding tedium of much technologically-
driven work. It also tends to romanticize young people, offering a wholly positive view of
their critical intelligence and social responsibility that is deliberately at odds with that of
many social commentators. It is also bound to ignore the continuing “digital divide” be-
tween the technology rich and the technology poor, both within and between societies.
Technology enthusiasts are inclined to believe that this is a temporary phenomenon, and
that the technology poor will eventually catch up, although this is obviously to assume
that the early adopters will stay where they are. The possibility that the market might not
provide equally for all, or indeed that technology might be used to exploit young people
economically, does not enter the picture.43
Finally, this account of the “digital generation” is also bound to ignore what one can only
call the banality of much new media use. Recent studies suggest that most young people’s
everyday uses of the Internet are characterized not by spectacular forms of innovation and
creativity, but by relatively mundane forms of communication and information retrieval.44
The technologically empowered “cyberkids” of the popular imagination may indeed exist,
but even if they do, they are in a minority and they are untypical of young people as a whole.
For example, there is little evidence that most young people are using the Internet to develop
global connections; in most cases, it appears to be used primarily as a means of reinforcing
local networks among peers. Young people may be “empowered” as consumers, at least in
the sense of being able to access a much wider range of goods and services much more
easily. But as yet there is little sense in which they are being empowered as citizens; only
a minority are using the technology to engage in civic participation, to communicate their
views to awider audience, or to get involved in political activity.45 AsMarkWarschauer points
out, the potential for multimedia production—which requires the latest computers and
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software, and high bandwidth—is generally quite inaccessible to all but the wealthy middle-
classes.46 Research also suggests that young people may be much less ﬂuent or technologically
“literate” in their use of the Internet than is often assumed: observational studies suggest that
young people often encounter considerable difﬁculties in using search engines, for example,
although this is not to suggest that they are necessarily any less competent than adults in
this respect.47
Aside from those who are denied access to this technology, there are also many who
positively refuse or reject it, for a variety of reasons.48 Only a relatively small proportion of
young people are driven by a desire to purchase the latest technological gadgets or participate
in the latest form of online culture, and rather than being regarded as “cool,” they are
still often dismissed by their peers as “geeks.”49 In general, one could argue that for most
young people, technology per se is a relatively marginal concern. Very few are interested in
technology in its own right, and most are simply concerned about what they can use it for.
Ultimately, like other forms of marketing rhetoric, the discourse of the “digital generation”
is precisely an attempt to construct the object of which it purports to speak. It represents not
a description of what children or young people actually are, but a set of imperatives about
what they should be or what they need to become. To some extent, it does describe a minority
of young people who are actively using this technology for social, educational and creative
purposes, yet it seems very likely that most of these people are the “usual suspects,” who are
already privileged in other areas of their lives and whose use of technology is supported by
their access to other forms of social and cultural capital.
Of course, none of this is to deny that different generations or age cohorts will have
different kinds of experiences, and that these may result in “generation gaps.” Generations
can be deﬁned—and come to deﬁne themselves—through their relationships to traumatic
historical events, but also through their experiences of rapid social change (as, for example, in
the case of the “Sixties generation.”)50 Nor is it to deny that contemporary developments in
technology do indeed present new opportunities—and indeed new risks—for young people.
Some differences between generations are a perennial function of age—the interests of the
young and the old are bound to diverge in systematic and predictable ways—but others are a
consequence of broader historical developments, which include technological change. Even
so, the emergence of a so-called “digital generation” can only be adequately understood
in the light of other changes—for example, in the political economy of youth culture, the
social and cultural policies and practices that regulate and deﬁne young people’s lives, and
the realities of their everyday social environments. These latter changes themselves can also
be overstated, and frequently are, but in any case, it makes little sense to consider them in
isolation from each other.
These issues are taken up in various ways in later chapters. The authors are generally wary
of easy assumptions about the impact of technology on young people, and of the dangers
of romanticizing youth. They are also keen to locate contemporary uses of technology in
relation to older forms of communication or of teenage social interaction. Susan Herring’s
chapter provides the most direct challenge to these kinds of assumptions, puncturing some
of the easy rhetoric about the “digital generation,” and locating adults’ views of young people
and technology in a broader historical context. At the same time, she is keen not to fall into
the trap of merely suggesting that “we’ve seen it all before.” Technology—in combination
with a whole series of other social and economic changes—is transforming young people’s
experiences, albeit in ways that (as Herring suggests) may only become fully apparent several
years further down the line.
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The Place(s) of Learning Finally, what are the implications of these arguments for our
thinking about learning? Learning is undoubtedly a central theme in popular debates about
the impact of digital technology.51 On the one hand, critics have often seen technology as
incompatible with authentic learning. For example, the use of computers in schools has been
condemned for undermining students’ creativity and for emphasizing mechanical rote learn-
ing, and it has also been seen to promise instant gratiﬁcation, at the expense of encouraging
students to develop the patience that is required for the hard work of education.52
On the other hand, advocates of technology have extolled its value for encouraging cre-
ative, student-centered learning, for increasingmotivation and achievement, and for promot-
ing demanding new styles of thinking.53 Don Tapscott and Marc Prensky, for example, wax
lyrical about the interactive, playful styles of learning that are promoted by the Internet and
by computer games. Prensky’s “digital natives” and Tapscott’s “net generation” are seen as
more inquisitive, self-directed learners: they are more sceptical and analytical, more inclined
toward critical thinking, and more likely to challenge and question established authorities
than previous generations. Above all, learning via these new digital media is seen as guaran-
teed “fun,” as the boundaries between learning and play have effectively disappeared.54
Academic analyses of learning in relation to digital media have drawn on a wide range of
perspectives. It is sometimes forgotten that one of the key advocates of behaviorist theories
of learning, B. F. Skinner, was also an enthusiast for what he termed “teaching machines”—
machines that have some striking similarities with contemporary computers.55 Behaviorism
is certainly alive and well in the design of contemporary “drill and skill” software, although
most enthusiasts for computers in education tend to espouse a form of “constructivism”
that emphasizes active, student-centered learning rather than instruction.56 More recent ap-
proaches have drawn on social theories of learning, such as the “situated learning” approach.
From this perspective, learning is seen to be embedded in social interactions (or “communi-
ties of practice”), and it can take the form of a kind of apprenticeship, as newcomers observe
and gradually come to participate in particular social practices by modeling and working
alongside “old timers.” This theory also suggests that learning entails the development (or
“projection”) of a social identity; in learning, we take on, or aspire to take on, a new role as a
member of the community of practice in which we are seeking to participate. Such theories
have an obvious relevance to the study of online social networks, for example in the case of
gaming and fan communities.57
One key emphasis in these debates is on the importance of the “informal learning” that
characterizes young people’s everyday interactions with technology outside school. Seymour
Papert, for example, extols the value of what he calls “home-style” learning, seeing it as self-
directed, spontaneous, and motivated in ways that “school-style” learning is not,58 while
Marc Prensky and Don Tapscott also look outside the school for alternatives to what they
regard as the old-fashioned, instructional style of Baby Boomer teachers. Similar arguments
have increasingly been made by academic researchers, who have looked to young people’s
leisure uses of digital technology—for example, in the form of computer games—as a means
of challenging the narrow and inﬂexible uses of information and communications technol-
ogy (ICTs) in schools.59
To be sure, young people’s everyday uses of computer games or the Internet involve awhole
range of informal learning processes, in which there is often a highly democratic relationship
between “teachers” and “learners.” Young people learn to use these media largely through
trial and error. Exploration, experimentation, play, and collaboration with others—both in
face-to-face and virtual forms—are essential elements of the process. Playing certain types
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of computer games, for example, can involve an extensive series of cognitive activities:
remembering, hypothesis testing, predicting, and strategic planning. While game players are
often deeply immersed in the virtual world of the game, dialogue and exchange with others
is crucial. And game playing is also a “multiliterate” activity: it often involves interpreting
complex three-dimensional visual environments, reading both on screen and off screen
texts (such as games’ magazines, and websites), and processing auditory information. In the
world of computer games, success ultimately derives from the disciplined and committed
acquisition of skills and knowledge.60
Likewise, online chat and instant messaging require very speciﬁc skills in language and
interpersonal communication.61 Young people have to learn to “read” subtle nuances, often
on the basis of minimal cues. They have to learn the rules and etiquette of online communi-
cation, and to shift quickly between genres or language registers. Provided youths are sensible
about divulging personal information, online chat provides young people with a safe arena
for rehearsing and exploring aspects of identity and personal relationships that may not be
available elsewhere. Again, much of this learning is carried out without explicit teaching: it
involves active exploration, “learning by doing,” apprenticeship rather than direct instruc-
tion. Above all, it is profoundly social: it is a matter of collaboration and interaction with
others, and of participation in a community of users.
In learning with and through these media, young people are also learning how to learn.
They are developing particular orientations toward information, particular methods of ac-
quiring new knowledge and skills, and a sense of their own identities as learners. They are
likely to experience a strong sense of their own autonomy, and of their right to make their
own choices and to follow their own paths—however illusory this may ultimately be. In
these domains, they are learning primarily by means of discovery, experimentation, and
play, rather than by following external instructions and directions.
Even so, there are some important limitations to all this. Media content is, of course, not
necessarily neutral or reliable: it represents the world in particular ways and not others, and
it does so in ways that tend to serve the interests of its producers. Activities such as chat and
game play are heavily bound by systems of rules, even if the rules are not always explicitly
taught and even if they can sometimes be broken or bent. The structure or “architecture”
of software itself (for example, of links on the Internet) imposes very signiﬁcant constraints
on the ways in which it can be used. And the social worlds that users enter into as they
participate in these activities are by no means necessarily egalitarian or harmonious. For all
these reasons, we need to be wary of simply celebrating young people’s “informal” experiences
of media and technology, and there are good reasons to be cautious about the idea of simply
extending those experiences into the more “formal” context of the school.
This raises the important question, not so much of how young people learn with technology,
but of what they need to know about it. The need for “digital literacy” is fast becoming a grow-
ing concern among educators and policy-makers in many countries. To date, however, most
discussions of digital literacy have been conﬁned to a fairly functional approach; the empha-
sis is on mastering basic skills in using technology, with some limited attention to evaluating
the reliability or credibility of online sources (an issue addressed in detail in another of the
volumes in this series). These are undoubtedly important issues, but digital literacy clearly
needs to be seen much more broadly. Literacy is more than a matter of functional skills, or
of knowing how to access information; we need to be able to evaluate information if we are
to turn it into meaningful knowledge. Critical literacy is not just about making distinctions
between “reliable” and “unreliable” sources: it is also about understanding who produces
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media, how and why they do so, how these media represent the world, and how they create
meanings and pleasures.62
In this respect, I would argue that digital literacy should be seen as part of the broader ﬁeld
of media literacy. There is a long history of media literacy education in many countries, and
there is a well-established conceptual framework and a repertoire of classroom strategies that
are recognized and shared by teachers around the world.63 Clearly, new media such as games
and the Internet require new methods of investigation, and new classroom strategies, and
schools need to think hard about how they should respond to the more participatory forms of
media culture that are now emerging (for example in the form of blogging, social networking,
fan cultures, video production, game making, and so on).64 Nevertheless, media educators’
long-standing concerns with questions about representation, about the characteristics of
media “languages,” and about the ownership and production of media continue to be highly
relevant here, as does the emphasis on connecting these more critical concerns with the
practical production of media (enabling students to create websites or digital videos, for
example).
The issue of learning is addressed indirectly by several of the contributors here, but it is
taken up most explicitly in the two ﬁnal chapters. Kirsten Drotner’s key concern is with the
implications of young people’s emerging digital cultures for the institution of the school.
How should teachers and schools build on the forms of creativity and learning that young
people are experiencing in their everyday uses of digital media? Rather than making the
school redundant, Drotner argues that it has a new role to play, both in addressing inequal-
ities in access to technology and in providing new forms of literacy. Meanwhile, Shelley
Goldman, Meghan McDermott and Angela Booker focus on the possibilities and the chal-
lenges of “informal” learning in out-of-school contexts. While technology does provide
important new possibilities for self-expression and communication, they clearly show that
technology in itself does not make the difference. On the contrary, we need to think hard
about the “social technologies”—the other forms of social interaction—and the types of
pedagogy that surround the technology, and which crucially determine how it will be used.
(These authors’ concern with the role of digital media in young people’s civic participation
is taken up in another volume in this series.)
Conclusion
Simply keeping pace with the range of young people’s engagements with digital media is an
increasingly daunting task. Inevitably, there will be many gaps in our account here. Some
of them are more than amply ﬁlled by other books in this series, such as the volumes on
games, on ethnicity, and on civic engagement. Other gaps relate to the types of young people
who are addressed here. To date, research on young people and digital media has tended to
focus on the “early adopters,” who, as I have suggested, are also likely to be privileged in
other areas of their lives. Some of the chapters here—such as those by Sandra Weber and
Claudia Mitchell, and by Shelley Goldman, Meghan McDermott, and Angela Booker—do
focus explicitly on disadvantaged young people, although this is an issue that needs to be
addressed more effectively in future research.
Even so, our hope for this book is that the theme of identity will provide a useful lens
through which to view particular aspects of young people’s relations with digital media more
clearly. Identity is a very broad and ambiguous concept, yet it focuses attention on critical
questions about personal development and social relationships—questions that are crucial
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for our understanding of young people’s growth into adulthood and the nature of their
social and cultural experiences. Focusing on this theme gives us a particular “take” on the
relationship between the individual and the group. It raises questions about social power
and inequality, and it enables us to connect the study of technology with broader questions
about modernity and social change.
Perhaps most importantly, a focus on identity requires us to pay close attention to the di-
verse ways in which media and technologies are used in everyday life, and their consequences
both for individuals and for social groups. It entails viewing young people as signiﬁcant social
actors in their own right, as “beings,” and not simply as “becomings” who should be judged
in terms of their projected futures. In our view, the needs of young people are not best served
either by the superﬁcial celebration or the exaggerated moral panics that often characterize
this ﬁeld. Understanding the role of digital media in the formation of youthful identities re-
quires an approach that is clear sighted, unsentimental, and constructively critical. We trust
that this collection will be read, and its contents debated, in an equally rigorous manner.
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